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BOOK REVIEWS
PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL. By John M. MacDonald, M.D.
Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1957. Pp. xi, 227. $5.50.
Twenty years ago the late George Dession predicted that "the infil-
tration of psychiatry-and of psychiatrists-into the administration
of criminal law" would one day be recognized as "overshadowing all
other contemporary phenomena!' in its influence on the evolution of
criminal justice.' If this prophecy has not already come true it is
certain that it soon will. The increasing participation of psychiatrists,
clinical psychologists and psychiatric social workers in many phases
of the educational, welfare and correctional activities of government
is clear. The profound influence they have exerted on child training
is familiar. It is taken for granted that no major criminal trial will
be complete unless at least one phychiatrist has appeared on the
scene. Indeed, the criminal trial itself is becoming increasingly obso-
lete as a method of sifting out mentally irresponsible offenders. The
issue of mental illness is more and more often determined by the
examination and reports of court appointed impartial experts, the
staff of a state mental institution, or the personnel of a clinic attached
to the court. In the better juvenile courts psychiatric techniques are
almost routine procedure. The same is true of family courts. In cor-
rectional institutions psychiatry is an accepted measure of classifica-
tion, rehabilitation and pre-parole preparation. Less publicity is
given the role of the psychiatrist in civil cases, yet he is probably
called as an expert witness in at least twenty civil cases for each
criminal one. Interesting and difficult psychiatric problems for both
lawyers and psychiatrists also arise in workmen's compensation, di-
vorce, testamentary, contract, adoption, and guardianship cases. In
addition, the emphasis of contemporary psychiatry and psychology
upon unconscious determinants of behavior has stimulated a re-exami-
nation by lawyers of those legal assumptions that were influenced by
earlier, but now discarded, concepts and perspectives of these disci-
plines. Finally, psychiatry has sensitized us all to the complexity of
our own motivations, whether as law-makers, clients or complainants,
prosecutors or defenders, jurors or judges, or otherwise.
Dr. MacDonald as Assistant Medical Director of the Colorado Psy-
chopathic Hospital and as Consulting Psychiatrist to the District
Courts of Colorado has had an opportunity to see and participate in
some of these developments at first hand. Although his purpose in
1. Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 Yale L. J.
319 (1938).
Washington University Open Scholarship
BOOK REVIEWS
writing this book "is to provide a practical guide to the psychiatric
examination of the suspected criminal"2 and although it "is intended
for the physician rather than the attorney'"3 his book is not without in-
terest to the legal profession. His chapters on The Simulation of Insan-
ity, Narcoanalysis, Amnesia, Epilepsy and the Electroencephalogram,
The Psychopathic Offender, Alcoholism, The Sex Offender, Psycholog-
ical Tests, and The Psychiatrist in the Witness Stand contain many
shrewd and wise insights suggestive for the lawyer. Unfortunately,
his references to the legal literature are neither up to date, exhaus-
tive, nor selective.
Dr. MacDonald hopes that his book will serve to stimulate more
psychiatrists to enter the forensic field. Most lawyers will join
heartily in this wish. There is a much broader issue, however, that
is not discussed in the book and one that advocates of interdisciplinary
collaboration rarely consider. What Dr. MacDonald is doing is ex-
horting his medical colleagues to participate in the making of sanc-
tioning decisions on behalf of the community at large. They are
being asked to function outside the private relation of physician and
patient in situations in which a person who presents psychiatric prob-
lems also happens to be in conflict with others to such an extent that
the community is involved, either at present or prospectively. In
these situations, a significant interaction between the goals, perspec-
tives and value orientations of psychiatrists and community decision-
makers takes place. The psychiatrist is therapy oriented and other-
wise professionally conditioned to think of his prime obligation as one
to his patient. There can be no quarrel with this and no difficulties
arise so long as the patient is not also a party to a sanctioning pro-
ceeding or otherwise in serious conflict with others. When the latter
occurs, however, complications develop. When a psychiatrist func-
tions as an expert witness to a court or as a recommending agent to a
correctional authority he is stepping into a role and assuming a
function somewhat different-and perhaps more exacting-than those
involved in his private practice. He moves outside the private relation
of physician and patient. He has to consider something quite differ-
ent from the question whether a voluntary patient needs and may
benefit from the help he can give. He must take the interests of
the community as a whole into account and has to realize that his
recommendation will likely be followed by legal coercion without re-
gard to the wishes of the patient. The community, of course, is
interested in the patient and in health and therapy generally. Its
resources, however, are limited and must be used selectively. It also
2. P. vii.
3. Ibid.
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has a great range of other interests and if total community policy is
to be served a rather complex arbitration may be involved.
Suppose, for example, that the psychiatrist is called upon to exam-
ine and report on a person he has never previously seen. After an
examination typical under the circumstances, the psychiatrist is sat-
isfied that this person qualifies as a potentially dangerous and aggres-
sive psychopathic sex offender, although he has so far committed no
overt offenses beyond indecent exposure. Here again are problems of
conflicting values. The community, if it has enacted one of the recent
types of sex offender laws, has manifested some interest in the pre-
vention of seriously aggressive sexual offenses and some willingness
to rely on expert prophecy. On the other hand, the same community
would usually be very loath to authorize the infliction of severe sanc-
tions on suspicion alone. This interest in civil liberty is indicated by
the requirements for a conviction of an attempt to commit a crime.
Proof of mere intent to commit a crime or of a propensity to do so is
not enough. There must also be proof of some overt action reasonably
adapted to that end and carried to a point where there is a dangerous
probability of success. In the example given of the sex offender many
medically oriented people would be less troubled by the application
of the sanction of indeterminate commitment to a hospital than would
many who are litigation oriented.
This suggests another interesting question. Should the laws that
undertake to designate classes of persons subject to sanctions speak
in psychiatric or nonpsychiatric terms? And, in what terms should
the psychiatric witness be questioned and in what terms should he
speak? In other words, should the psychiatrist be asked whether a
person is neurotic, psychopathic, psychotic or normal? Or, should he
be asked questions such as the following: What is the probability that
this person will behave in such and such a fashion in the future,
specifying the sorts of situations the answer assumes he will face?
What is the probability that such situations will occur? On what past
events are these estimates based? What opportunities have psychi-
atrists had to validate estimates of this sort? These questions are
raised because the verbal categories used by psychiatrists in describ-
ing patients in the therapeutic context may involve value judgments
which, while consistent with community policy in that context, may
not be consistent with community policy in the context of community
sanctioning. The difference, of course, stems from the absence of
coercion in the private practice situation and its onmiprescence in the
legal one. In other words, if medical diagnostic and prognostic terms
are uncritically used in the sanctioning process they are likely to
cloak a host of value judgments of a quite different order than they
do in private practice. If a person is labeled "psychotic" this is likely
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to be taken to mean that he should be committed to a hospital and
released only when, thanks to shock therapy, other treatment, or sheer
passage of time he is diagnosed as no longer "disturbed." If he is
arrested for some minor sex offense and is called a "psychiatrically
deviate personality" this is likely to be taken to mean something more
than that he has problems and would benefit from psychotherapy.
He may well be committed for an indeterminate period to a custodial
institution whether or not it is in fact in a position to treat him. If
an accused pleads irresponsibility and is called "neurotic" or "psycho-
pathic" this is likely to be taken to mean that he should receive the
maximum retributive sentence.
Dr. MacDonald is certainly aware that it is important for the psy-
chiatrist who participates in the sanctioning process to look at his
own value judgments and his own terminology in the light of their
implications for the broader social scene. I wish he had made it more
explicit in his book. In any event, the expanding knowledge of psy-
chiatry and the increasing participation of psychiatrists in the for-
mation of community policy can only serve to make community deci-
sions more enlightened and more capable of realistic application.
RICHARD C. DONNELLYt
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. By W. Barton Leach and Owen
Tudor. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1957. Pp. xiii, 265, 1957
Cumulative Supplement. $10.00.
An addict of material on the rule against perpetuities who purchases
any new treatise without looking beyond the cover is doomed to dis-
appointment if he believes he has an entirely new work on the subject
in this particular book. As is clearly stated on the title page this
treatise is: "Reprinted from American Law of Property with Appen-
dices on Perpetuities Reform by Statute Since 1947 and Cumulative
Supplement Prepared by the Authors."
The American Law of Property1 has been comprehensively reviewed
by a large number of legal scholars including a former classmate of
mine, Bertel M. Sparks, Professor of Law at New York University.2
For this reason I would consider it merely "gilding the lily" if I were
to undertake an extensive analysis of the textual portion of the work
under review. However, there are certain parts of the text that should
be called to the attention of those who may not be familiar with the
parent work.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 7 vols. Casner ed. (1952).
2. 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1052 (1953).
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